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The common law has recognized certain classes of persons who 
may be kept in pupilage, viz. infants, lunatics, married women . . . .1 
– John Chipman Gray  
Indeed, seamen are treated by congress, as well as by the parlia-
ment of Great Britain, as deficient in that full and intelligent re-
sponsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary adults, 
and as needing the protection of the law in the same sense in which 
minors and wards are entitled to the protection of their parents and 
guardians. “Quemadmodum pater in filios, magister in discipulos, 
dominus in servos vel familiares.”2 
    – Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for the Court in  
Robertson v. Baldwin 
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 1. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION 243 (2d ed. 1895). 
 2. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897). As translated by Professor Katherine Ta-
chau, scholar of medieval intellectual history, the Latin quotation reads: “[I]n the same way that the 
father has over his sons, the teacher over his students, and the lord over his servants and retinue.” 
E-mail from Katherine H. Tachau, Professor of History, Univ. of Iowa, to author (Sept. 19, 2015) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Tachau]. For the likely source of the quotation, see 
infra note 55. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court held that merchant 
seamen under contract could be legally compelled to work notwithstand-
ing the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary 
servitude.3 According to the Court, seamen were “deficient in that full 
and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary 
adults,” and therefore could—along with children and wards—be de-
prived of liberty.4 From a present-day perspective, the Court’s casual 
deprecation of seamen’s intelligence and character might seem anachro-
nistic, even shocking. But the Court’s most recent Thirteenth Amend-
ment opinion, United States v. Kozminski (1988), approvingly mentioned 
not only Robertson’s broad principle—“that the Thirteenth Amendment 
was not intended to apply to ‘exceptional’ cases well established in the 
common law at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment”—but also the 
specific examples of children, wards, and sailors.5 
Robertson’s domestic exclusion raises intertwined issues of class 
and gender. As a general rule, the Thirteenth Amendment limits inequali-
ties of class, where class is conceived as “power relationships among 
groups involved in systems of production.”6 Regardless of contractual 
consent, workers may not be legally or physically compelled to work.7 
The Supreme Court has explained this principle in terms of class power, 
as necessary to prevent the “master” from dominating the “laborer”: 
“When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obliga-
tion to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above 
to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.”8 
Robertson carves out a gendered exception to this protection, relegating 
                                                     
 3. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287–88. 
 4. Id. at 287. 
 5. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988). 
 6. See Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-
Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 819 (2003); Frances L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: 
Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024–25 (1989). 
The concept of class is distinct from that of economic status. Status is measured in gradations on a 
vertical scale, and the competition for status typically takes the form of a zero-sum game in which 
success is measured by how many others are lower on the scale. Mahoney, supra, at 823–26. 
 7. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242–44 (1911). 
 8. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18. 
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seamen to what political theorist Carole Pateman has described as “the 
private sphere of natural subjection and womanly capacities.”9 
By contrast, it is an open question whether the Amendment reaches 
gender relations.10 On that issue, Robertson has historically served to 
block jurisprudential development by preserving the domestic sphere as a 
zone where services can be coerced free from Thirteenth Amendment 
scrutiny. As Joyce McConnell has shown, Robertson’s domestic exclu-
sion has operated to deprive women, married or not, of protection against 
coercion by intimate partners.11 When a woman enters into an intimate 
relationship with a man, then, she departs the public sphere of class rela-
tions and loses her Thirteenth Amendment protection against coercion of 
services. 
Over the past few years, however, several courts have applied statu-
tory bans on “involuntary servitude” and “forced labor” (a “species of 
involuntary servitude”12) to protect women and children in domestic set-
tings.13 These cases suggest that Robertson’s categorical exclusion is ripe 
for reconsideration. Part I of this Article traces its roots to the common 
law of the household, the shared point of origin both of class and gender 
hierarchies. It suggests that the Thirteenth Amendment posed a potential 
challenge to traditional assumptions of natural hierarchy and benevolent 
paternalism in the domestic sphere. Part II reviews the Robertson deci-
sion, focusing especially on justifications for the exclusion. Part III dis-
cusses Thirteenth Amendment law and scholarship concerning the physi-
cal coercion of services from children and women in domestic settings. 
I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE DOMESTIC LAW:            
EARLY TENSIONS 
In colonial America, the household served as a crucible of class and 
gender hierarchies. Slaves, bound servants, apprentices, hired servants, 
wives, children, and wards all lived under the dominion and protection of 
                                                     
 9. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 113 (1988); see also infra note 43 and accompa-
nying text. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 119–134. 
 11. Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the 
Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 216–17 (1992); see infra note 119 and accom-
panying text. 
 12. United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 156 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. granted, judgment vacat-
ed on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (stating that forced labor was considered by Congress to 
be a “species of involuntary servitude,” providing evidence from the text and legislative history of 
the statute to support that conclusion, and holding that a penalty enhancement provision that express-
ly applied only to “involuntary servitude” and “peonage” also applied to forced labor). 
 13. See infra notes 104–114, 135–148 and accompanying text. The involuntary servitude and 
forced labor statutes were enacted under authority of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
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the master of the house.14 “[T]he household stands,” observes legal histo-
rian Christopher Tomlins, “as the crucial and historically specifiable 
point of intersection in the genealogy of [three] strands of legal dis-
course: the law of service and of employment, the law of conjugal and 
familial relations, the law of slavery.”15 To Adam Smith, for example, 
the law of slavery nested in the broader category of master-servant law, 
which, in turn, fell under the heading “Domestic Law” along with the 
law of “Husband and Wife,” “Parent and Child,” and “Guardian and 
Ward.”16 As of the late nineteenth century, Anglo-American legal think-
ers continued to treat “the interrelationship of these strands, spun togeth-
er over the previous two centuries, as both obvious and natural, a time-
less legal homology—‘the domestic relations’—that boxed the compass 
of normative social life.”17 Even when faced with cases involving factory 
workers who could not plausibly be classified as part of their employer’s 
household, nineteenth-century American courts chose to import the prin-
ciples of domestic master-servant law, complete with their underlying 
assumptions of natural hierarchy and benevolent paternalism.18 
The Thirteenth Amendment, with its broad prohibition of “slavery” 
and “involuntary servitude,” threatened to disrupt the master’s dominion 
not only over slaves, but also over children, wives, and apprentices. Dur-
ing congressional debates over the Amendment, Representative Chilton 
White of Ohio warned that all of these relations rested on the same con-
stitutional foundation: 
The guarantee of the Constitution is for the enforcement of the local 
municipal laws by the concentration of the power of the whole peo-
ple. The parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a 
property in the service of that child. A husband has a right of prop-
erty in the service of his wife; he has the right to the management of 
his household affairs. The master has a right of property in the ser-
vice of his apprentice. All these rights rest upon the same basis as a 
man’s right of property in the service of slaves. The relation is 
                                                     
 14. See Labor and Employment Law - United States Law, in 3 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 477, 477 (Stanley Katz ed., 2009). 
 15. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC IDENTITY IN 
COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580–1865, at 376 (2010). To illustrate his point, Tomlins points to 
the title of an influential American treatise: TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF 
PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT (1816). Id. 
 16. ADAM SMITH, Lectures On Jurisprudence, in 5 THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G. Stein eds., 1982) (1762–
1763). 
 17. TOMLINS, supra note 15, at 376. 
 18. CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REP-
UBLIC 229–30 (1993). 
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clearly and distinctly defined by the law, and as clearly and distinct-
ly recognized by the Constitution of the United States.19 
If all of these relations rested on the same foundation, then the aboli-
tion of any one of them might entail the abolition or regulation of all. 
Opponents cited this danger in support of their contention that the Thir-
teenth Amendment so fundamentally altered the constitutional order that 
it could not be enacted under a mere power to “amend.” If the federal 
government “by constitutional amendment, can regulate the relation of 
master and servant,” warned one senator, “it certainly can, on the same 
principle, make regulations concerning the relation of parent and child, 
husband and wife, and guardian and ward.”20 After ratification, the same 
specter was deployed against the Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted to 
enforce the Amendment. “I say that this bill,” charged Senator Edward 
Cowan, “confers upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon 
lunatics . . . the right to make and enforce contracts.”21 To Cowan and his 
allies, the Act exceeded the scope of the Amendment by regulating these 
and other domestic relations, for example, apprenticeships.22 Proponents 
of the Amendment and of the Civil Rights Act responded by denying that 
either the Amendment or enforcement legislation would affect, in the 
words of historian Amy Dru Stanley, “any household relation but slav-
ery.”23 
Nevertheless, the Amendment’s ratification in December 1865 in-
evitably posed the question whether the enacted text, which contained no 
such limitation, covered domestic relations other than chattel slavery. 
African-Americans across the South wasted no time seeking relief for 
their children from involuntary apprenticeship, usually to their former 
masters.24 Freedmen’s Bureau officials and southern judges and juries 
struggled to distinguish between valid and invalid apprenticeships and, in 
1867, Supreme Court Justice Salmon Chase, riding circuit, ruled that a 
black girl’s apprenticeship constituted “involuntary servitude” in viola-
tion of the Amendment.25 These early cases focused on the absence of 
parental consent but, eventually, “[a]s patriarchal domination of the fami-
                                                     
 19. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White); see also CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (statement of Rep. Fernando Wood). 
 20. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1865) (statement of Sen. Powell). 
 21. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1782 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan). 
 22. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 499 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan). 
 23. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE 
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 57 (1998). 
 24. See JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815–1880, at 178–93 (1998). 
 25. Id.; see also In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867). The Freedmen’s Bureau was 
an agency of the U.S. government, established to assist liberated slaves in the transition to freedom. 
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ly eroded, apprenticeship came to be seen more as a labor relation-
ship . . . [falling] within the proscription of the thirteenth amendment.”26 
If the Amendment pulled apprenticeship partly or entirely out of the 
household, then it might do the same for other domestic relations of ser-
vice. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in a case involving 
adult seamen. 
II. ROBERTSON V. BALDWIN 
Robert Robertson and three other seamen contracted with a ship-
ping company to serve on a voyage of the barkentine Arago from San 
Francisco to Washington State and then to Valparaiso, Chile. By the time 
the ship reached Astoria, Oregon, the men had become dissatisfied with 
the work. They departed the ship without permission. The master of the 
Arago sought and obtained a warrant for their arrest pursuant to the 
Shipping Commissioner’s Act of 1872. U.S. Marshal Barry Baldwin 
jailed them pending the Arago’s departure date, and then forcibly re-
turned them shipboard.27 With help from the Seamen’s Union of the Pa-
cific, they challenged the constitutionality of the Shipping Commission-
er’s Act.28 In Robertson v. Baldwin, the Supreme Court rejected their 
suit, holding that seamen under contract may be legally and physically 
coerced to work for private ship owners notwithstanding the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on slavery and involuntary servitude.29 
Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for a majority of eight, of-
fered several justifications for the ruling. First, he reasoned that the Thir-
teenth Amendment was not intended to change the law with regard to 
“services which have from time immemorial been treated as exception-
al,” and that seamen had been legally prohibited from “deserting” (quit-
ting their jobs) since the days of ancient Rhodes.30 By itself, this criterion 
could not do the work of distinguishing exceptions from prohibited prac-
tices. The Thirteenth Amendment was enacted precisely to abolish prac-
tices that had been recognized in law from time immemorial.31 There 
                                                     
 26. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
437, 458 (1989). Cf. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1282 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
coercion of children’s labor by cult leaders constituted “involuntary servitude” under a statute enact-
ed to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment notwithstanding the parents’ consent). 
 27. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 28. HYMAN WEINTRAUB, ANDREW FURUSETH: EMANCIPATOR OF THE SEAMEN 35–36 (1959). 
 29. See Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287–88. 
 30. Id. at 282–87. 
 31. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (1992) (commenting that “[a]lthough 
the Robertson dictum rested on immemorial custom, custom alone cannot be the sole test of the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s meaning, because the Amendment was designed to challenge long-
standing institutions and practices that violated its core values of personhood and dignity,” and pro-
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could be no time-honored exceptions to a ban on slavery and involuntary 
servitude until and unless there was such a ban in effect.32 When Con-
gress first provided for the forcible return of deserting seamen in 1792, 
for example, most states permitted slavery, indentured servitude re-
mained lawful, and the Constitution provided for the return of any person 
“held to Service or Labour” who escaped across state lines.33 In that legal 
context, a seaman’s contract would have looked more like a short-term 
indenture—lawful in any trade—than an occupational exception to a 
general ban on slavery and involuntary servitude. On the criterion of ori-
gins in “time immemorial,” then, seamen’s contracts could not be distin-
guished from numerous other instances of coerced labor. 
Second, Brown warned that if a sailor could not be coerced to work, 
then he could “abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or 
even in a storm at sea.”34 Today, with regard to most constitutional rights 
guarantees, this kind of concern would be met by applying some level of 
judicial scrutiny, ranging from rational basis to strict scrutiny. Because 
the right to quit work is a core Thirteenth Amendment right,35 its in-
fringement would trigger heightened scrutiny, which requires that the 
infringement serve an important or compelling interest and that it be sub-
stantially related or narrowly tailored to the protection of that interest. 
Nobody would doubt that the safety of passengers and crew at sea is a 
compelling interest, but it is hard to see how a ban on quitting in port is 
                                                                                                                       
posing that “[a]ny exception to the Amendment’s reach must be limited to those historic practices 
that are consistent with the Amendment’s central thrust”). 
 32. As Andrew Koppelman remarks, the notion that some services have “‘from time immemo-
rial been treated as exceptional’ . . . simply makes no sense; how can there be an exception that 
antedates the rule?” Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abor-
tion, 84 NW. U. L. REV 480, 525 (1990). Justice Harlan, dissenting, made this point with regard to 
various examples offered by the majority. The maritime laws of ancient Rhodes, for example, “were 
enacted at a time when no account was taken of man as man, when human life and human liberty 
were regarded as of little value, and when the powers of government were employed to gratify the 
ambition and the pleasures of despotic rulers rather than promote the welfare of the people.” Robert-
son, 165 U.S. at 293 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note, however, that at least some 
abolitionists prefigured Robertson’s exception for seamen. See E. R. TYLER, SLAVEHOLDING A 
MALUM IN SE, OR INVARIABLY SINFUL 4 (1837) (quoted in David R. Upham, The Understanding of 
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist” Before the Thirteenth Amendment, 14 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016) (stating that the “services which children, wards, seamen and 
others, owe to their parents, guardians and employers, may be unwillingly rendered, and yet justly 
exacted”). 
 33. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 287; ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE 
LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 253–54 (2001). Indentured servitude remained legal in some 
areas covered by the Northwest Ordinance, from which the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on “slav-
ery” and “involuntary servitude” was drawn. See id. at 256–61 (Ohio and Illinois). It could not be 
said, then, that under the Ordinance seamen were excepted from a general ban on coerced labor. 
 34. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 280. 
 35. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240–41 
(1911). 
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substantially related or narrowly tailored to that interest.36 In any case, 
Brown chose not to rely on the essential services rationale; his reference 
to storms at sea came in the midst of an extensive discourse about the 
general question whether the Amendment permitted the enforcement of 
labor contracts through physical or legal coercion—an issue left unre-
solved.37 Instead, Brown held that even if the Amendment did generally 
prohibit such enforcement (the rule eventually adopted by the Court in 
Bailey v. Alabama), seamen were excluded from protection.38 
To distinguish seamen from other workers, Brown offered a third 
justification. Sailors could be denied the right to quit work because, like 
children and wards, they required the guidance and protection of others.39 
In particular, Brown suggested that seamen were “deficient in that full 
and intelligent responsibility for their acts which is accredited to ordinary 
adults.”40 He found supporting evidence in what he considered to be 
“very careful provisions” of law protecting seamen against “the frauds 
and cruelty of masters, the devices of boarding-house keepers, and, as far 
as possible, against the consequences of their own ignorance and improv-
idence.”41 Interestingly, Brown’s disparaging view of seamen’s intelli-
gence and responsibility did not appear in the parties’ briefs. It had, how-
ever, been propagated by the shipowners in the course of lobbying 
against legislative reform.42 In addition, it reflected popular perceptions 
of seamen who, though paragons of manliness aboard ship, were often 
unable to fulfill their shoreside gender roles as “man of the house,” not 
                                                     
 36. This might help to explain why, within a few years of Robertson, courts declined to apply it 
as authority for permitting coerced labor in various, allegedly extreme circumstances. See Noah 
Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and 
Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 943 nn.95–98 (2016). Interestingly, the seamen’s brief for 
rehearing, authored by U.S. Representative James G. Maguire and Stanford law faculty member 
Jackson H. Ralston, accepted the seamen’s duty not to desert at sea, but maintained that it ran not to 
the employer but to their fellow seamen, removing it from the category of “servitude.” Even in the 
“extreme case” of a dangerous storm at sea, argued the brief, a seaman was not “bound to continued 
servitude under his contract, but he is bound not to desert other men, in a danger into which he has 
led them, or into which they have gone, mutually relying upon each other. He must remain with 
them until the danger has passed, until they are in a position of safety, then and not until then does 
the question of his servitude under his contract arise, and then if he is not willing further to serve 
under his contract, he cannot, and should not, be compelled so to do involuntarily.” Petition for 
Rehearing and Recall of Mandate at 12–13, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 287 (1897) (No. 
334). 
 37. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281. 
 38. Id. at 281, 287–88. 
 39. Id. at 287. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. ARNOLD BERWICK, THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN OF THE SEA: THE LIFE OF ANDREW 
FURUSETH 49 (1993). 
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primarily because of ignorance or improvidence, but because of pro-
longed absences at sea.43 
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan charged that the “supposed 
helpless condition” of sailors was nothing more than an “excuse for im-
posing upon them burdens that could not be imposed upon other clas-
ses.”44 Neither Brown’s majority opinion nor Harlan’s dissent mentioned 
that a similarly paternalistic rationale had been deployed to justify the 
forcible extraction of labor from Africans, the core concern of the 
Amendment.45 And, although the failure of paternalistic protection was 
far more egregious in the case of chattel slaves, it also appears that 
Brown’s “very careful” protections for seamen were ineffective on the 
ground.46 At any rate, from our vantage point today, Brown’s commen-
tary on seamen’s intelligence and character appears as nothing more than 
a casual expression of prejudice, deployed to justify the denial of a basic 
freedom.47 
The United States’ brief advanced a fourth possible justification. 
Seamen under contract, it suggested, are indistinguishable from enlisted 
soldiers. Both groups ceased “to be independent, separate, and distinct 
beings, directed and controlled only by their own distinct reason and 
will, and they each become . . . parts of a machine, the successful and 
                                                     
 43. See Ruth Wallis Herndon, The Domestic Cost of Seafaring, in IRON MEN, WOODEN 
WOMEN: GENDER AND SEAFARING IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1700–1920, at 55, 57–58 (Margaret S. 
Creighton & Lisa Norling eds., 1996). 
 44. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 299 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 45. See, e.g., Howard McGary, Paternalism and Slavery, in SUBJUGATION AND BONDAGE: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON SLAVERY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 187–206 (Tommy L. Lott ed., 1998) 
(describing the paternalistic justifications for slavery and arguing that the system was not, in fact, 
paternalistic); MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, 
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 100 (2001) (recounting that opponents of the Thirteenth 
Amendment argued that Africans were naturally suited to slavery and that, if released from white 
control, they would succumb to white vices); see also Zatz, supra note 36, at 944–45 nn.103–05 
(observing that “[s]uch a view of sailors was hardly distant from, or less self-serving than, white 
Southern elites’ views of Black laborers,” and suggesting that Robertson excluded sailors from the 
class “of people for whom the Thirteenth Amendment’s ‘system of free labor’ was designed, free 
and equal citizens who could look after their own interests in the market”). 
 46. Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New 
Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 284–85 (2004) (discussing punishments—
including beatings, imprisonment, short rations, chaining, and gratuitously dangerous assignments—
used by shipmasters to extract labor from seamen during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and concluding that “the paternalism of modern shipboard labor relations was actually rather fraudu-
lent”). 
 47. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 
2001, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2001-01-01/are-human-
rights-universal (including Robertson’s holding, along with the quoted statement, among human 
rights violations that debunk the notion that Western civilization can lay claim to a long tradition of 
respecting human rights norms, in contrast to traditions of brutality and tyranny in Muslim and other 
societies). 
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efficient operation of which must depend largely, if not altogether, upon 
the fact and the manner of their performance of the duty assigned to 
them.”48 This idea echoed the opinion of shipowners, who feared that any 
insubordination or lapse in discipline would imperil the safety of passen-
gers, ship, and cargo.49 
Justice Brown, however, chose not to rely on the soldier-sailor 
analogy and, two decades after Robertson, the Court clarified that the 
exception for soldiers rested on entirely different grounds. In the Selec-
tive Draft Law Cases (1918), the Court upheld wartime military con-
scription against a Thirteenth Amendment challenge.50 Chief Justice Ed-
ward Douglass White’s opinion for the Court distinguished involuntary 
servitude from “the exaction by government from the citizen of the per-
formance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of 
the rights and honor of the nation as the result of a war declared by the 
great representative body of the people.”51 On this theory, wartime mili-
tary conscription differed from private employment both because the 
draftees served for the benefit of the entire nation (including themselves) 
not a private master, and because they were subject to the will not of a 
private master, but of a representative government in which they had a 
voice.52 Further, far from reflecting servility or slavishness, public ser-
vice in a Republic was considered to be “noble,” an expression of patri-
otism and civic virtue.53 None of these considerations applied to service 
in the employ of profit-seeking, private ship owners. 
The question still remains: why single out seamen from other work-
ers? Judging from their companions in Robertson’s exception—infants 
and lunatics—one might think that sailors were distinguished for their 
weakness. Indeed, Robertson was decided at the beginning of the 
so-called Lochner Era, a time when the Court generally selected for pa-
ternalistic treatment “groups it understood as weak,” a category that in-
                                                     
 48. Brief for the United States at 10, Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 288 (1897) (No. 
334). 
 49. See, e.g., Emerson E. Parvin, The Working of the Seamen’s Act, 6 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 
CITY N.Y. 113, 120 (1915). 
 50. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). 
 51. Id. 
 52. As of January 1918, when the Court issued its ruling, men aged 21–30 were subject to the 
draft, and the voting age was 21. Selective Service Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76 
(1917); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 225 (2009). The draft age was lowered to 18 later that year, 
creating a disjuncture that would not be eliminated until 1970, in the midst of the Vietnam War. See 
id. at 226–27. 
 53. See Arver, 245 U.S. at 390; Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 1903) (distinguish-
ing slavery and involuntary servitude from “the discharge of honorable public duties, which every 
patriotic citizen or subject owes to his government”); Koppelman, supra note 32, at 521. 
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cluded women and black peons.54 There is reason to believe, however, 
that sailors might have been chosen for precisely the opposite reason. 
Seamen were notable not for weakness or ignorance, but for their tough-
ness and high level of class consciousness. As of 1707, when Giuseppe 
Lorenzo Maria Casaregis penned the Latin text quoted by Justice Brown, 
the relations between ship captains and crew might actually have reflect-
ed a relatively benevolent form of feudal paternalism.55 Long before 
Robertson, however, capitalism had displaced feudalism in the Atlantic 
maritime world, and the ship had become a “prototype of the factory” 
and a crucible of class struggle.56 The conditions of shipboard employ-
ment, including shared hardship, periodic danger, mutual dependence of 
coworkers, racially diverse crews, and a sharp separation between offic-
ers and crew, fostered exceptionally strong class identification and rela-
tively accepting attitudes toward crew members of other races and na-
tionalities.57 From an elite point of view, seamen as a group were dan-
gerously independent. As recounted by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus 
Rediker, they formed the core of the “motley crews” that fueled what 
elites saw as a “many-headed monster” of laboring class and slave re-
sistance.58 The term “strike” entered the industrial lexicon in 1768, when 
seamen in Newcastle and London “struck (lowered down)” the sails of 
merchant ships and refused to resume work unless granted a wage in-
crease. Days later, other trades “struck” and paraded with the sailors, not 
                                                     
 54. Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 383, 386 (2001); 
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 52–53 
(1991); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United 
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 255 (1987). 
 55. Professor Tachau located the likely source of the quotation in a seventeenth century work. 
E-mail from Tachau, supra note 2 (identifying the source as GIUSEPPE LORENZO MARIA CASAREGIS, 
DISCURSUS LEGALES DE COMMERCIO (LEGAL LECTURES ON COMMERCE) 136 (1707)). She notes 
that the phrase appears in a sentence that analogized the ship captain’s authority to a set of relation-
ships selected not for exceptionally strong authority, but for limitations on authority: “A master has 
no large jurisdiction over his ship, but only in his economic or disciplinary power, which extends 
[only] to light punishments, such as for correcting insolence . . . in the same way that the father has 
over his sons, the teacher over his students, and the lord over his servants and retinue.” Id. (interpret-
ing CASAREGIS, supra, at 136). Indeed, it appears that “medieval shipboard life was dominated by 
norms of paternalism, reciprocity, and stability” which “often encouraged enduring and mutually 
supportive relationships between a seaman and his captain.” White, supra note 46, at 283. 
 56. See PETER LINEBAUGH & MARCUS REDIKER, THE MANY-HEADED HYDRA: SAILORS, 
SLAVES, COMMONERS, AND THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ATLANTIC 150 (2000). 
 57. See MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA 110–11 (1989); 
W. JEFFREY BOLSTER, BLACK JACKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN SEAMEN IN THE AGE OF SAIL 96–100, 
87–88 (1997); White, supra note 46, at 288–89. It should be emphasized that this tendency toward 
acceptance was limited; sailors of color were often treated with intolerance and brutality. See 
BOLSTER, supra, at 93–96. 
 58. LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, supra note 56, at 212–19, 221–26; see also Jesse Lemisch, Jack 
Tar in the Streets: Merchant Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 
371, 387 (1968). 
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only to win higher wages but also to protest the imprisonment of John 
Wilkes, a fearless critic of King George.59 American sailors, described by 
one respectable observer as “wretches of a mongrel descent” including 
“African Blacks by Asiatic Mulatoes,” marched in the leading ranks.60 
Meanwhile, on the American side of the Atlantic, sailors struck and pro-
tested over impressment and other issues.61 
Prosperous Americans sometimes supported the goals of such 
crowds, but usually joined the British in expressing their “Abhorrence” 
of unruly actions by sailors “and other persons of mean and Vile Condi-
tion.”62 In his successful defense of British soldiers involved in the Bos-
ton Massacre, John Adams knew that he could capture the sympathies of 
the jury by describing the crowd as a “motley rabble of saucy boys, ne-
groes and molattoes, Irish teagues, and out landish jack tarrs.”63 In south-
ern ports, free black sailors refuted the natural inevitability of African 
slavery merely by moving about and conducting themselves like other 
free laborers.64 Southern legislatures responded by passing “Negro Sea-
men’s Acts” requiring black sailors to remain shipboard while in port.65 
American courts and legislators also singled out sailors’ strikes for ex-
ceptionally harsh penalties. While other American strikers faced charges 
of labor conspiracy, typically punished with light fines, seamen could be 
prosecuted for desertion and even mutiny, which carried multiyear prison 
terms and, until 1835, the possibility of death.66 
The Robertson litigation had been organized by Andrew Furuseth, a 
leader of the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific.67 Furuseth, a true believer in 
the Thirteenth Amendment (at least where the rights of white workers 
were concerned), rejected the Court’s ruling and launched a campaign to 
                                                     
 59. See ANNUAL REGISTER, OR A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY, POLITICKS, AND LITERATURE FOR 
THE YEAR 1768, at 92, 107 (1768) [hereinafter ANNUAL REGISTER]. See generally Richard Sheldon, 
The London Sailors’ Strike of 1768, in ANDREW CHARLESWORTH ET AL., AN ATLAS OF INDUSTRIAL 
PROTEST IN BRITAIN 1750–1990, at 12–17 (1996). 
 60. See ANNUAL REGISTER, supra note 59, at 106–09, 113; see also LINEBAUGH & REDIKER, 
supra note 56, at 219–21. 
 61. Lemisch, supra note 58, at 387. Four of the eleven casualties at the Boston Massacre, in-
cluding Crispus Attucks, were mariners. FREDERIC KIDDER, HISTORY OF THE BOSTON MASSACRE, 
MARCH 5, 1770, at 287–88 (1870). 
 62. Lemisch, supra note 58, at 387. 
 63. 3 JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 266 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel 
eds., 1965). 
 64. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM 
SOUTH 215–19 (1981). 
 65. See, e.g., Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 
1822–1848, 1 J.S. HIST. 3, 3–28 (1935). 
 66. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14; White, supra note 46, at 290–91. 
American courts defined mutiny broadly to include even strikes that involved nothing more than a 
collective refusal to work, staged while the ship rested in port. Id. at 294–95. 
 67. WEINTRAUB, supra note 28, at 35–36. 
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overturn it through legislation.68 It took nearly two decades, but the 
LaFollette Seamen’s Act of 1915 repealed the statutory provisions that 
had been upheld in Robertson. Senator LaFollette celebrated his bill’s 
enactment as a repudiation of the Court’s ruling. “I rejoice that in the 
Providence of God I am permitted at last to hail you,” he wired the Sail-
ors’ Union, “as free men under the Constitution of our country.” The 
Thirteenth Amendment had become, he concluded, “a covenant of refuge 
for the seamen of the world.”69 The courts have not, however, followed 
Congress’s lead on this point. As we have seen, the Supreme Court men-
tioned Robertson favorably in its most recent opinion on the Thirteenth 
Amendment.70 And lower courts continue to cite Robertson as authority 
for rejecting Thirteenth Amendment claims brought by seamen.71 
Outside Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the notion that con-
stitutional guarantees implicitly import time-honored, common law ex-
ceptions no longer retains much traction. At the time, Justice Brown 
drew the principle from the then-current jurisprudence of the Bill of 
Rights. “The law is perfectly well settled,” he asserted, that the Bill of 
Rights was intended only “to embody certain guaranties and immunities 
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from 
time immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, 
arising from the necessities of the case.”72 Although courts continue to 
                                                     
 68. FORBATH, supra note 54, at 154–55 n.104. Furuseth defended his union’s whites-only rule 
and urged the American Federation of Labor to authorize segregated unions. WEINTRAUB, supra 
note 28, at 112–13; 4 THE BLACK WORKER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 5–6 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds.,1978). 
 69. WEINTRAUB, supra note 28, at 132 (quoting LaFollette). Further research would be neces-
sary to determine exactly what LaFollette meant by this. The Act was eventually upheld under Con-
gress’s powers to regulate commerce and maritime matters (or, in the language of the Constitution, 
to enact legislation necessary and proper for the execution of the judicial power over admiralty). 
O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 39 (1943). At the time that LaFollette 
made his comment, however, it appeared that labor relations—even those concerning employees of 
carriers involved in interstate or foreign commerce—lay outside the scope of the commerce power. 
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 177 (1908) (striking down federal law prohibiting inter-
state carriers from discriminating on the basis of union membership, and defining “commerce” as 
“traffic, intercourse, trade, navigation, communication, the transit of persons and the transmission of mes-
sages by telegraph,-indeed, every species of commercial intercourse among the several states,-but not that 
commerce ‘completely internal, which is carried on between man and man, in a state, or between different 
parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect other states’”). It is possible that LaFollette 
was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment as authority for the legitimacy of the end for which the mari-
time power was being exercised. Cf. George Rutherglen, The Constitution and Slavery Overseas, 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695 (2016) (analyzing the Amendment’s potential role in validating exercises of other 
powers). Or, he might have been expressing his own opinion that, apart from the question of what power 
would be relied upon to defend the Act in court, it in fact implemented the Amendment. 
 70. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988). 
 71. See, e.g., Burke v. Mathiasen’s Tanker Indus., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1975) 
(applying Robertson’s exception for seamen and citing similar cases). 
 72. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897). 
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cite this statement favorably,73 they also feel free to ignore it, as two of 
Brown’s own supporting examples illustrate. “Thus, the freedom of 
speech and of the press,” he wrote, “does not permit the publication of 
libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to 
public morals or private reputation.”74 Since 1897, the Supreme Court 
has jettisoned each of those categorical exceptions, conferring considera-
ble constitutional protection on common law libels and indecent 
speech.75 In short, the notion of time-honored exceptions appears to func-
tion more as makeweight than principle. 
III. THE FATE OF INFANTS AND WOMEN AFTER ROBERTSON 
For a long time, Robertson did not attract much attention from 
courts or scholars. Aside from the exclusion of seamen, its exceptions 
appeared to be uncontroversial.76 Then, in the early 1990s, scholars 
launched noteworthy challenges to Robertson’s exception for parent–
child relations and its implicit exception for women in intimate relation-
ships.77 And, in the last few years, some thoughtful judges have moved 
beyond the categorical exceptions to confront the problem of distinguish-
ing domestic relations that constitute slavery or involuntary servitude 
from those that do not.78 These cases could presage important advances 
in Thirteenth Amendment doctrine. In the typical involuntary servitude 
case (involving peonage, for example), there is a clear foil for the 
claimed coercion of labor: the system of free labor. But in the domestic 
abuse context, that baseline is not available.79 In the recent child abuse 
and battering cases, courts have at last embarked on the project of devel-
oping a parallel concept of free domestic relations. 
A. Children Enslaved by Their Parents 
Parents enjoy plenary authority over their minor children, including 
the power to prevent them from departing the relationship. Yet nobody 
would contend that children generally suffer a condition of slavery pro-
                                                     
 73. See, e.g., Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2012); NRA v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 74. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281. 
 75. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (indecent speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel). 
 76. In the years following Robertson, defenders of peonage argued that its exception should be 
extended to agricultural laborers, who could despoil an entire crop by quitting during the harvest. 
Courts rejected these contentions, however, and Robertson languished. Zatz, supra note 36, at 944–
46 nn.103–14. 
 77. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31; McConnell, supra note 11. 
 78. See infra notes 104–114, 135–148 and accompanying text. 
 79. I am indebted to Noah Zatz for pointing this out. 
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hibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. What happens, however, if par-
ents abuse and exploit their children as if they were slaves? In a 1992 
article, Akhil Amar and Daniel Widawsky argued that the Amendment 
should apply. “Under ordinary circumstances,” they acknowledged, “pa-
rental custody does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment because, it is 
presumed, the parent exercises control over the child in the interests of 
that child.”80 But when a parent “systematically” abuses and degrades his 
child in ways that are “not plausibly for the benefit of the child,” he vio-
lates the Thirteenth Amendment.81 The authors acknowledged Robert-
son’s dictum excluding parent–child relations from coverage but argued 
that it should be “refined” into a more sensitive test.82 “Although the 
Robertson dictum rested on immemorial custom, custom alone cannot be 
the sole test of the Thirteenth Amendment’s meaning, because the 
Amendment was designed to challenge longstanding institutions and 
practices that violated its core values of personhood and dignity.”83 Ac-
cordingly, they called for “a test tailored to mark the subtle but all-
important line between freedom and slavery in the specific case of chil-
dren.”84 
The notion that the Thirteenth Amendment has anything to do with 
parental child abuse might seem counterintuitive to some, but Amar and 
Widawsky presented a straightforward case. In answer to the obvious 
objections, they contended: 
[A] person can be a Thirteenth Amendment “slave” whether or not 
she is a minor; whether or not the ‘master’ is a blood relation of the 
“slave”; whether or not she has African roots; whether or not the 
enslavement takes the form of forced “labor”; and whether or not 
the enslavement is officially sanctioned by state law.85 
None of these claims appear to be especially controversial. The Thir-
teenth Amendment liberated not only adult slaves but also child slaves, 
many of whom were owned by their biological fathers.86 Nobody doubts 
that the Amendment prohibits the enslavement of any person, regardless 
of race.87 And few would contend that the Amendment freed only slaves 
who provided services recognized as economically valuable in the legal 
                                                     
 80. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31, at 1364. 
 81. Id. at 1377. 
 82. Id. at 1374. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1365. 
 86. Id. at 1367. 
 87. Id. at 1368 (citing, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872)) 
(“[W]hile negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, 
it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.”). 
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marketplace, and not those who provided intimate personal services in-
cluding the gratification of their masters’ sexual and sadistic desires.88 
Finally, it is generally accepted that the Amendment applies to private as 
well as state action.89 These claims do not compel the result favored by 
Amar and Widawsky (such clarity is rarely to be had with regard to an 
abstractly worded provision like the Thirteenth Amendment), but they 
certainly make a prima facie case. 
Richard Posner, however, has rejected the argument on the slippery 
slope ground that Amar and Widawsky’s methodology “would make the 
Constitution a cornucopia of new rights.” He contends that Amar and 
Widawsky read the term “slavery” metaphorically, and “[t]o treat consti-
tutional terms metaphorically is . . . to remove any textual check on con-
stitutional interpretation.”90 Posner is not wrong that the term slavery is 
often used metaphorically, as for example when we “call an executive a 
‘slave’ of his job.”91 But Amar and Widawsky were not writing meta-
phorically. The 1865 edition of Webster’s Dictionary defined slavery as 
the “condition of a slave; the state of entire subjection of one person to 
the will of another,” and slave as a “person who is held in bondage to 
another; one who is wholly subject to the will of another; one who has no 
freedom of action, but whose person and services are wholly under the 
control of another.”92 Children are wholly under the control of their par-
ents, and thus would appear to fall within the literal definition of slavery. 
We nevertheless exclude them from the category because we assume that 
parents require services and impose discipline in the context of a caring, 
family relationship. As Amar and Widawsky point out, parents do not 
(and did not at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment’s enactment) enjoy 
an “absolute vested right in the custody” of their children; instead, the 
law conditioned (and conditions) custody on the parents acting in the 
                                                     
 88. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31, at 1370; see also United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 
1242, 1260–61 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendants’ argument that the Thirteenth Amendment 
applies only to “work that was economic in nature,” citing Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thir-
teenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 405 (1993) for the proposition that “many slaves were in fact the 
victims of sadism and torture rather than being put in the fields[,] . . . and yet they were surely cov-
ered by the core of the Thirteenth Amendment,” and Neal Kumar Katyal, Men Who Own Women: A 
Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J. 791, 796, 811 (1993), for the 
observation that “the context of coerced prostitution, which involves compelled sexual chores, sur-
rounds the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against forced labor.” 
 89. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 
942 (1988). 
 90. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 214 (1995). 
 91. Id. at 212. 
 92. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1241 (1865); 
see also JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1352 (1860) (defining 
slavery as the “state of absolute subjection to the will of another; the condition of a slave; servitude; 
bondage”). 
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interest of the child.93 Far from indulging in fanciful metaphors, then, 
Amar and Widawsky merely suggest that certain forms of child abuse 
not only fall within the literal definition, but also should be recognized as 
Thirteenth Amendment slavery. Where a parent “systematically” abuses 
and degrades her child to such an extent that her conduct is “not plausi-
bly for the benefit of the child,” she loses the benefit of the parent–child 
exception to the literal definition of slavery.94 As an example, Amar and 
Widawsky offer the facts of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department 
of Social Services, in which a young child suffered disabling brain inju-
ries from a series of beatings inflicted by his father over a period of at 
least fifteen months.95 They conclude that in that situation, where the 
parent had repeatedly used his child as a thing, “a punching bag,” the 
standard was satisfied.96 
Not only metaphor but also analogy figures in Posner’s critique. He 
contends that a case of child abuse could “just as readily be analogized” 
to a violent mugging as to chattel slavery. He asks whether the plight of 
an abused child is “more like that of the mugging victim or more like that 
of a slave on a cotton plantation in Mississippi in 1850?”97 Posner poses 
this question rhetorically, apparently assuming that the mugging analogy 
is at least equally plausible. But is it? Putting aside possible quibbles 
with his formulation (for example, why not analogize to a child slave on 
a cotton plantation owned by the child’s father?), I would submit that a 
child suffering abuse of the type targeted by Amar and Widawsky bears a 
considerably closer resemblance to the plantation slave than to a mug-
ging victim. Like the slave, the abused child endures long-term and ple-
nary control by a master. By contrast, the mugging victim suffers mo-
mentary physical domination in a single encounter. Also like the Missis-
sippi slave, the abused child is compelled to provide valuable services to 
her master, whether in the form of labor, gratification of sexual or sadis-
tic desires, or provision of the innumerable psychological satisfactions 
that can flow from the domination of a human being. Even a child whose 
service consists of passively absorbing abuse also serves the master by 
eating, sleeping, and reproducing herself as a target. By contrast, the 
                                                     
 93. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31, at 1375–76 (quoting United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 
30, 31–32 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256)); see also Upham, supra note 32. 
 94. The literal definition carves out no exception for parent-child relationships, perhaps be-
cause the condition of slaves and the condition of children have not always been so distinct. See, 
e.g., People ex rel. O’Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 285 (1870) (recounting that in ancient Rome, 
the law “gave fathers the power of life and death, and of sale, over their children,” but observing that 
“[i]n this age and country, such provisions would be atrocious”) (quoted in Amar & Widawsky, 
supra note 31, at 1375). 
 95. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191–94 (1989). 
 96. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31, at 1378. 
 97. POSNER, supra note 90, at 213. 
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mugging victim cannot be said to provide service in the normal sense of 
the word.98 On these criteria of enslavement—control and compelled 
service—the plantation slavery analogy would appear considerably more 
compelling than the mugging analogy. 
Jamal Greene offers another slippery slope objection: that Amar 
and Widawsky’s proposal would force judges to address complex issues 
outside the parent–child relation, for example “numerous instances of 
common criminal behavior, apprenticeships, workplace harassment, do-
mestic abuse among adults, and not an insignificant number of judicial 
clerkships.”99 The final example suggests that this statement might be 
intended more as humor than as serious argument. But suppose we were 
to take it seriously. Amar and Widawsky’s proposal applies only to a 
relationship, that of parent and child, that is legally and practically struc-
tured to ensure one person’s total control over another. None of Greene’s 
examples share that feature, and he gives us no reason to believe that the 
slope between the actual issue under discussion (systematic, sustained 
abuse not plausibly for the benefit of a child) and the feared results 
(Greene’s examples) is actually very steep or slippery. Admittedly, we 
might slide down to certain kinds of domestic abuse among adults, but 
then—as discussed below—there might be good reason to go that far.100  
Although critics worry that Amar and Widawsky’s proposed doc-
trine would be difficult to apply, it actually comports with an apparently 
straightforward and workable body of case law developed in similar cas-
es. Inmates of psychiatric hospitals, for example, have challenged hospi-
tal work requirements on Thirteenth Amendment grounds. Although 
some inmates are, like children, subject to a degree of control that falls 
within the literal definition of slavery, we do not generally consider them 
to be slaves because they are in custody for their own benefit. However, 
inmates may establish a Thirteenth Amendment violation if they can 
show that a work requirement is “devoid of therapeutic purpose”—a 
standard that bears a close resemblance to Amar and Wildawsky’s “not 
plausibly for the benefit” of the child.101 A similar standard has been ap-
                                                     
 98. See, e.g., WEBSTER, supra note 92, at 1206 (defining service as the “act of serving; the 
occupation of a servant; the performance of labor for the benefit of another, or at another’s com-
mand; attendance of an inferior, or hired helper, or slave, &c, on a superior, employer, master, or the 
like”); WORCESTER, supra note 92, at 1314 (defining service as “[t]he act of one who serves; labor 
or duty performed for, or at the command of, a superior”). 
 99. Jamal Greene, Thirteenth Amendment Optimism, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1743 (2012). 
 100. See infra Part II.B. 
 101. Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966) (sending mental patient’s claim of 
involuntary servitude to trial on the ground that a program of mandatory chores for mental patients 
might be “so ruthless in the amount of work demanded, and in the conditions under which the work 
must be performed, and thus so devoid of therapeutic purpose, that a court justifiably could [find] 
involuntary servitude”); see also Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 450–51 (E.D. Wis. 
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plied in cases involving high school community service requirements 
(constitutional as long as the requirement is “educational” and “not ex-
ploitative”)102 and compelled child labor in a religious camp (illegal “in-
voluntary servitude” where the children were compelled to perform “ex-
tra services . . . that accrued to defendants’ personal benefit”).103 In short, 
Amar and Widawsky have proposed what appears to be a workable and 
tested standard. 
In a pair of recent cases, two panels of the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals implicitly rejected Robertson’s blanket exceptions for parent–
child and guardian–ward relations. In United States v. Toviave, the court 
overturned the forced-labor conviction of a man who had used systematic 
and brutal beatings to compel four minor relatives, including his younger 
sister, to perform domestic chores and occasionally babysit for his girl-
friend and relatives.104 In its statement of facts, the court noted that 
“Toviave was not always cruel,” that he took the children on family trips, 
bought them sports equipment, hired an English tutor, created extra 
homework assignments for them, and required them to study regularly on 
pain of the same harsh punishments that he used to extract services.105 
The court cited Robertson for the proposition that the Thirteenth 
Amendment does not abrogate “the right of parents and guardians to the 
custody of their minor children or wards,” but did not rely on such a 
sweeping exception.106 Instead, the court focused more specifically on 
the parent’s “right to make his child perform household chores.”107 The 
use of extreme force, by itself, could not transform a parent’s exercise of 
this right into the crime of “forced labor.”108 By contrast, a parent would 
violate the statute if she subjected her child to “paradigmatic forced la-
bor, such as prostitution, forced sweatshop work, or forced domestic ser-
                                                                                                                       
1974) (mental patients may state a cause of action for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment if they 
establish that they were compelled to work and “that the work they performed was not therapeutic”); 
United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 
(2009) (upholding conviction of doctor for subjecting mental patients to involuntary servitude where 
there was evidence that their farm labor and participation in sexual activities had no therapeutic 
value); Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of a 
Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 395 (1995). 
 102. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 460 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 
813 (1996). For other examples, see Kares, supra note 101, at 395. 
 103. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1281 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding conviction of 
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vice.”109 Why did the children’s household chores and babysitting not 
amount to “forced domestic service”? Because those tasks were “not be-
yond the bounds of what a guardian can reasonably expect from his 
child.”110 This standard of reasonableness takes the inquiry far beyond 
Robertson’s categorical exception and begins the project of distinguish-
ing, as Amar and Widawsky put it, “legitimate (‘family’) and illegitimate 
(‘slavery’) forms of parental control.”111 
The Toviave court did not factor Toviave’s caring side into its rea-
soning or standard, but another panel of Sixth Circuit judges later restat-
ed Toviave’s holding to emphasize that consideration: “We held that [the 
forced labor statute] did not proscribe the defendant’s conduct in Toviave 
because ‘it has always been true that parents can make their children per-
form [household chores],’ and the evidence showed that the defendant 
was otherwise concerned about the minors’ well-being.”112 This standard 
differs from Amar and Widawsky’s (“domination and degradation not 
plausibly for the benefit of the child”),113 but not by much. It exempts 
abuse that is too brutal to be plausibly for the benefit of the child, but that 
is deployed to compel household chores and other tasks that a parent or 
guardian “can reasonably expect from his child” so long as the parent or 
guardian is “otherwise concerned about the minors’ well-being.”114 Un-
der this standard, child abuse does not become a Thirteenth Amendment 
issue unless the parent or guardian either compels services beyond those 
that can reasonably be expected (involuntary servitude), or inflicts abuse 
in the context of a relationship where she does not otherwise show con-
cern for the minor’s well-being (slavery—treating the child as a thing, a 
chattel). Assuming that children cannot reasonably be expected to serve 
as providers of sexual or sadistic pleasure, this would seem to capture the 
cases that most concern Amar and Widawsky. At the same time, it would 
avoid the necessity for courts to inject the Thirteenth Amendment into 
cases involving ordinary child abuse. 
B. Women Reduced to Involuntary Servitude 
Unlike children, adult women enjoy the formal legal freedom to es-
cape from abusive relationships. Joyce McConnell has argued, however, 
that some men batter their female partners into a condition of involuntary 
servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Her claim is a nar-
                                                     
 109. Id. at 626. 
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 111. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 31, at 1377. 
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row one. She contends that “women who are coerced through physical 
violence or threats of physical violence to provide services they do not 
choose to provide” can make out a constitutional violation if the violence 
is administered “repeatedly” and “over a period of time, including the 
degradation and isolation of the woman being battered.”115 This type of 
abuse, she points out, falls within even the narrow definition of involun-
tary servitude stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kozmin-
ski.116 The batterer effectively nullifies the victim’s formal right to depart 
by deploying violence and threats of violence against her, her children, 
and other loved ones with the objectives of inflicting psychological ter-
ror, isolating the victim from family and friends, enforcing economic 
dependency, and breaking down the victim’s will to resist.117 
However, as noted above, Kozminski also reaffirmed Robertson v. 
Baldwin, albeit in dictum.118 Robertson did not specifically mention the 
husband–wife relation, but—as McConnell observes—“it is reasonable 
to conclude that, like the parent and child relationship, the relationship of 
husband and wife was considered by the courts to be protected from the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition by its unique common law sta-
tus.”119 Moreover, the Amendment’s framers, ratifiers, and early enforc-
ers repeatedly denied that it would interfere with the husband’s dominion 
over his wife.120 Members of Congress did hold that the Amendment 
reached the domestic sphere, but mainly to guarantee the right of the 
freedmen to the same sovereignty over their wives and children as was 
enjoyed by white men.121 
According to some, this kind of history should conclude the in-
quiry. Justice William Rehnquist, for example, once opined that “if ever 
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there were an area in which federal courts should heed the admonition of 
Justice Holmes that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic,’ it is in 
the area of domestic relations.”122 It may be, however, that the field of 
domestic relations poses difficult challenges for any interpretive method-
ology that centers on history. For those who value original meaning be-
cause it indicates democratic will or consent, it might be a problem that 
women were excluded from the Congresses that proposed the Amend-
ment, the state legislatures that ratified it, and the electorates that select-
ed both.123 For those who seek determinate meaning, there is the difficul-
ty that meaning is determined by context, and the context reflects pre-
vailing power relations including patriarchy.124 For those who value his-
tory because tradition embodies the genius or ethos of the American 
people, it seems unlikely that the patriarchal doctrines of male authority 
and separate spheres would be among those “traditions from which [the 
country] developed” as opposed to “the traditions from which it 
broke.”125 For those who include judicial precedent in their concept of 
history (or who value theoretical and jurisprudential consistency), there 
is the existence of a large body of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
built on the principles of gender equality and reproductive freedom not-
withstanding original expected applications to the contrary.126 
Moreover, it is possible that history is not as hostile to Thirteenth 
Amendment protection for women’s rights as might first appear. “We 
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often envision the hallmark of slavery’s inhumanity as the slave picking 
cotton under the overseer’s lash,” observes Dorothy Roberts. “[But as] 
much as slaves’ forced labor, whites’ control of slave women’s wombs 
perpetrated many of slavery’s greatest atrocities.”127 As Roberts and oth-
ers have made clear, these atrocities concerned not only the wombs of 
enslaved women, but also their entire bodies as vehicles for breeding and 
pleasure.128 Pamela Bridgewater points out that these abuses were promi-
nent among the evils of slavery targeted by antislavery advocates.129 She 
proposes that, taking this history into account, the Amendment should be 
read to prohibit not only the coercion and exploitation of labor, but also 
reproductive and sexual abuse.130 Relying on similar evidence, 
McConnell argues that the term “involuntary servitude” outlaws physical 
coercion of services generally—whether sexual, reproductive, or produc-
tive—in intimate relationships.131 Mary Ann Case and Alexander Tsesis 
further suggest that, as feminist abolitionists asserted at the time and the 
Supreme Court later affirmed, “throughout much of the 19th century the 
position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to 
that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”132 Examples include 
the married women’s property acts, denial of married women’s right to 
sue in court, occupational exclusions that applied to single as well as 
married women, denial of the right to vote, and vulnerability to domestic 
abuse.133 “One need not accept this argument categorically and argue,” 
observes Case, “that all marital and filial relations are called into ques-
tion by the Thirteenth Amendment to make the case that some are.”134 
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In the recent case of United States v. Marcus, the district court re-
jected the notion that the forced labor statute, enacted under authority of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, does not reach a “domestic, intimate rela-
tionship.”135 Glenn Marcus and a woman named Jodi entered into a con-
sensual relationship involving bondage, discipline, sadism, and maso-
chism (BDSM).136 Jodi agreed to serve as Marcus’s slave, in which role 
she submitted to sado-masochistic sex, performed household chores, and 
worked on Marcus’s BDSM website.137 Marcus gradually escalated his 
demands and inflicted more brutal punishments. In October 1999, Jodi 
announced that she wanted to leave. Marcus responded by brutally tor-
turing her and threatening that, if she left, he would send pictures to her 
family and the media.138 The relationship continued until August 2001, 
after which the frequency and extremity of Jodi’s interactions with Mar-
cus declined.139 Marcus was convicted of forced labor and filed a motion 
to set aside his conviction.140 
The forced labor statute makes it a crime to knowingly obtain the 
“labor or services” of another person by certain forms of coercion includ-
ing physical restraint and threats of serious harm.141 Marcus argued that 
Jodi’s work did not constitute “labor or services” under the statute be-
cause it transpired in the context of an “intimate, domestic relation-
ship.”142 District Judge Allyne R. Ross rejected this argument both as to 
Jodi’s household chores and her work on Marcus’s website. She noted 
that Jodi’s chores and website work clearly fell within the dictionary def-
initions both of labor (an “expenditure of physical or mental effort espe-
cially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory”) and services (“useful 
labor that does not produce a tangible commodity”).143 She then rejected 
Marcus’s slippery slope argument that the dictionary definitions would 
encompass ordinary domestic abuse, reasoning that “§ 1589 requires a 
link between the physical restraint or threats of serious harm and the ob-
taining of labor or services.”144 Accordingly, the court saw “no reason 
why the existence of a domestic partnership between two individuals 
should preclude criminal liability if one person knowingly uses ‘threats 
of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another 
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person,’ to obtain labor or services.”145 Judge Ross did not address the 
question whether Jodi’s coerced participation in BDSM sex constituted 
“labor or services,” but she did respond to Marcus’s slippery slope argu-
ment that applying the dictionary definitions would turn rape into a 
forced labor offense: 
The court recognizes that, in certain circumstances, a sexual act 
may constitute a labor or service. However, the court fails to see 
how the forced sexual act endured by a rape victim falls within the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase “labor or services,” as defined by 
the court in this opinion.146 
We might speculate that Judge Ross was envisioning a one-shot rape in 
which the victim was physically invaded but not forced to provide sexual 
services. By contrast, repeated rape in the context of an intimate relation-
ship would entail, at a minimum, the victim providing the services of 
consuming nourishment, sleeping, and otherwise maintaining herself for 
the perpetrator’s use while refraining from reporting his crimes to the 
authorities. 
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals summarized Mar-
cus’s arguments for excepting intimate domestic relations and expressed 
agreement “with the district court’s well-reasoned opinion that these ar-
guments are without merit.”147 The court then, however, proceeded to 
discuss only Jodi’s work on the website, which—as Judge Ross had not-
ed below—was sufficient to sustain the conviction.148 Neither Judge Ross 
nor the Second Circuit panel mentioned Robertson or the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Both did, however, apply the forced labor statute to ser-
vices extracted in the context of an intimate domestic relationship that 
began on a consensual basis—considerable progress beyond Robertson’s 
blanket exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Slavery was but one of many hierarchical relations, including par-
ent-child, husband-wife, master-apprentice, and master-servant, that 
arose within the legally constructed household. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude, which contained 
no explicit domestic exception, inevitably raised the question whether 
domestic service relations other than chattel slavery would be affected. 
The Supreme Court’s 1897 opinion in Robertson v. Baldwin limited the 
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Amendment’s reach, but its blanket exceptions appear anachronistic to-
day. In the dimension of class, Robertson denied Thirteenth Amendment 
protection to an entire category of workers based on an unsupported ju-
dicial determination that they lacked intelligence and responsibility, and 
therefore belonged in the domestic sphere of natural subordination. In the 
dimension of gender, it stripped women and children of protection in 
domestic settings based on common law notions that have since been 
repudiated in other areas of law. Although the Supreme Court has never 
questioned Robertson, scholars have suggested “refinements,” and some 
lower courts have applied statutory prohibitions on involuntary servitude 
to protect women and children in domestic contexts. These developments 
may presage the rejection, explicit or implicit, of Robertson’s categorical 
boundary between the public sphere of class and the private sphere of 
gendered domesticity. 
